FEDERALISMO ÀS AVESSAS

INSEGURANÇA E AUTOFAGIA DO PODER JURÍDICO

Abstract

This work seeks to reflect the role of cooperative federalism in modern democracy, providing an effective alternative to bring power closer to the people and guarantee a full democracy in the face of contemporary challenges, whose decentralization is seen as a fundamental pillar to promote democratic participation. In this democratic state context, state tax planning assumes a relevant role in guaranteeing the sources of financing (such as federal transfers) necessary for the implementation of public policies. Thus, in the light of the "Katchanga Theory", the objective is to analyze how the lack of limits in disputes over tax resources and jurisprudential volatility are directly linked, under the aegis of a counterproductive federalism, to the subjective interpretations of judges, to legal uncertainty and the threat to democracy. The aim is to examine whether the decision-making archetype of the Judiciary, especially the Federal Supreme Court (STF), strengthens the Democratic State of Law or whether it generates a reverse federalism. Therefore, it is essential to discuss the issue of subjectivism and the use of non-legal arguments that compromise the federative pact, leading to inconsistent and unstable revenue distributions. This requires a deeper analysis in the context of cooperative fiscal federalism, given that the Federal District's tax collection, for example, denotes relevant tax implications that reflect the coherent functioning of the order. Therefore, the adopted methodology follows an approach, initially, hypothetical-deductive (normative, doctrinal and jurisprudential basis) and, in the end, empirical, with critical considerations on the outlined exposition and the proposed outcome for improvement.